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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the effect that internet-related changes bring to the realm of 
free speech. A brief consideration of free speech as it currently exists in New 
Zealand is followed by an outline of the law relating to some of the accepted re-
strictions on such a right. Although there are definite free speech concerns with 
some of these limitations owing to a lack of in-depth analysis by the judiciary, it is 
nevertheless maintained that most do reflect contemporary community standards 
and are hence justifiable. The heart of this paper's goal lies in the discussion of 
how internet-related technologies affect many of the considerations that must be 
taken into account when considering the correct approach to a free speech ques-
tion that arise in an on-line context. Although it has been attempted to maintain 
the status quo by applying existing law via analogy, it is submitted that this type 
of "force-fit" application leads to even more extreme change. Either free speech 
will become too extreme, undermining the values protected by limitations to such 
a right, or insufficient, and manifest breaches of the right will follow. In order to 
maintain the present status of the law it is actually necessary to apply the law dif-
ferently, taking into account the unique changes the internet presents. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 15,000 words 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In the year 1450, a German goldsmith named Johann Gutenberg is credited with 
one of the most fundamental changes to the ability of humanity to communicate 
en masse since writing itself - the invention of the printing press. 1876 brought an 
equally fundamental breakthrough in terms of person-to-person interaction with 
Alexander Graham Bell's telephone. However, in 1969 few of the academics at 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the United States Department of De-
fence could have predicted that their contribution to the world of human commu-
nications would both combine and surpass these momentous events. Their tech-
nique of communicating would develop into today's internet, and the changes it 
brings carries with it need to fundamentally reconsider the way that notions of 
"free speech" are considered. 
The internet raises questions about the nature of speech and expression them-
selves, but also about how we place limits on these rights. Notions such as defa-
mation, copyright and suppression orders all need reconsideration in light of 
internet-era factors. It may seem as thought the internet is the ultimate forum for 
free speech, a lawless frontier where even the long arm of the law cannot infringe 
upon a supreme freedom of expression. However deeper reflections lead to the 
inexorable conclusion that freedom of speech can be harmed by the internet in 
two ways: firstly the application of existing, accepted law in certain ways might 
have a negative effect. A unique problem the internet presents is that in many in-
stances the alternate application of the same law can also produce an equally un-
desirable outcome. Secondly, excessive freedom of speech may have a negative 
effect in itself, rendering either itself or other, equally important rights meaning-
less, and hence contributing to its own downfall. 
This paper will first consider free speech as it currently exists in New Zealand. 
Although there are clear issues with free speech in itself, it will be necessary to 
make certain assumptions in order to evaluate internet-driven change. It will then 
go on to consider the status of some of the accepted limitations of the freedom of 
speech as they exist today. In order to fully evaluate the changes that the internet 
brings, it will be necessary to give a brief outline of the internet and some of its 
relevant technologies. This paper then hopes to show how these changes affect the 
concepts of free speech as they presently exist in New Zealand. It is this paper's 
contention that traditional methods of applying old laws to new by way of analogy 
are inadequate, and new methods are required in order to meet the change that the 
internet brings to a resolution that we desire. 
II FREE SPEECH IN NEW ZEALAND 
In order to fully evaluate the impact of the changes the internet brings, it is first 
necessary to examine both the right to free speech and the limits on such a right as 
they currently exist in New Zealand without internet influences. 
Free speech in the New Zealand legal system has a long history, stemming back 
into common law origins well before New Zealand was even discovered. 
Blackstone traces one form of free speech, that of absolute parliamentary privi-
lege, back to the reign of Edward the Confessor. 1 This right was most signifi-
cantly endorsed in the Bill of Rights (1688) where it was stated "the freedom of 
speech, and debates, and proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or 
questioned in any court or place out of Parliament."2 
The concept of a wider form of liberty was born in 1644 when John Milton ad-
dressed the Lords and Commons with his famous essay "Areopagitica," arguing 
that their should be no restrictions on the freedom of the press: "Give me the lib-
erty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liber-
ties."3 Milton's desire was fulfilled in 1694 when Parliament refused to renew the 
Licensing Act, creating, by default, a common law right of freedom of the press. 
1 
1 BI Com (9th Ed) 164; Edward the Confessor reigned circa 1042-1066 
2 l W & M ft 2 c 2, Part I, paragraph 8 
3 John Milton "Areopagitica" in Mi/ton's Prose Works (London, 1806) vol I, 325 
2 
John Stuart Mill emphasised the worth of free speech when he stated that real 
truth would only emerge through "the collision of adverse opinions."4 It is neces-
sary to have dialect between competing ideas, ultimately with the superior win-
ning out. Oliver Wendell Holmes expressed this same idea as "the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market."5 It would thus be wrong to suppress freedom of speech. 
Free speech has been associated with various concepts in its history: Parliament's 
freedom from interference, free press and media, and the ability to evaluate and 
criticise one's elected officials, as well as the more general freedom entitling 
someone to hold their own views. The White Paper to the Bill of Rights stated that 
a free speech provision is "of central importance in a democratic state ... "6 and 
identifies four functions of free speech: of individual fulfilment through self ex-
pression, democratic self government, to advance knowledge and reveal truth, and 
finally to achieve a more adaptable hence more stable community.7 
Free speech has found a place today in section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990: 
14. Freedom of expression- Everyone has the right to freedom of expres-
sion, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and 
opinions of any kind in any form. 
However, unlike many jurisdictions, rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights are not 
supreme law in New Zealand. A contrary legislative act does not result in the in-
validity of the competing statute. Furthermore, despite this long history, there is 
comparatively little jurisprudential thought or a legal framework upon which to 
pose questions in regards free speech. New Zealand's developing independent 
4 
John Stuart Mill On Liberty (Originally published 1859, this edition published by Hackett 
Publishing Co. Inc., New York, 1978) 50 
5 Abrams v United States (1919) 250 US 616, 630 
6 
A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper (1985), para 10.54 
7 above n 6, (l) - (4) 
3 
jurisprudence8 is at odds with the reliance on comparative international precedent, 
such as that based on the European Convention on Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms 1950 (the "European Convention") and the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms 1982 (the "Canadian Charter"). Reflecting the growth of in-
dependent jurisprudence, and in conflict with purported reliance on overseas au-
thority, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has rejected some overseas precedent 
for issues that have arisen before it. For example, in R v Grayson9 the Court of 
Appeal rejected the Canadian approach to evidence that results from unreasonable 
searches. 10 
Many of the limitations that currently exist in regards abrogating the right to free 
speech have not received New Zealand judicial scrutiny, and the precedent value 
of other comparative jurisdictions is questionable. For example, free speech rules 
in the United Kingdom following the adoption of the European Convention do-
mestically have resulted in significant changes to the rules relating to defamation. 
Although not expressly stated, Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd1 1 basically 
introduces a reasonableness requirement for reporting. 12 This approach has been 
rejected by the New Zealand Court of Appeal, maintaining a more traditional 
qualified privilege defence. 13 
In addition to a lack of analysis on most of the limits surrounding free speech, 
many issues that are even more fundamental that have been considered interna-
tionally have received no judicial contemplation in New Zealand. For example, 
what is "speech?" Does it require an expressive, innovative aspect, or are mere 
functional instructions sufficient? In what mediums does "speech" take place? 
Does it make a difference if one is "speaking" to an adult or a minor? In regards 
the internet, does all data that is transferred count? Or merely data that appears as 
words on the screen? Or something wider, data that conveys tangible concepts in 
8 
For example, New Zealand defamation and copyright law, and most notably New Zealand's 
Treaty of Waitangi jurisprudence (among other areas of law) are quite distinct from other 
jurisdictions 
9 
(1996) 3 HRNZ 250 
10 above n 9, 256 
11 (1999) 3 WLR 1010 
12 
Although not express, the fifteen (or more) principles seemingly amount to reasonableness 
13 
Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385 
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the form of words or images? There is no New Zealand jurisprudence on this 
threshold question. For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that 
"speech" includes all forms of communication, and will ignore distinctions that 
have been drawn in overseas jurisdictions. 14 In any event, in light of section 5 (see 
below), it is unlikely that New Zealand law would require as rigorous an intellec-
tual foundation as the United States. In the United States if one is seeking to 
abridge free speech in regards content, the Supreme Court has stated that there 
must be a compelling state interest to overcome the Constitutional protection. 15 
This is necessary in order to justify overruling supreme law. New Zealand only 
requires a demonstrably justifiable limitation, and is expressly permitted to over-
ride rights guarantees. Furthermore, although the Courts have yet to rule firmly in 
regards the "state action" requirement, 16 indications seem to be that the courts are 
willing to be bound (or at least influenced) by the Bill of Rights, even when de-
veloping common law actions that are between two private parties. 17 
Free speech can perhaps best be currently described as a noble ideal that should be 
considered wherever possible. It has been stated that the principle "must be given 
full weight" 18 and that there is a "prima facie presumption in favour of [free 
speech]." 19 Any limitations that "cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society"20 breach the Bill of Rights. However, reducing the worth of 
the positive statements is the fact that many prima facie breaches of the right to 
freedom of expression will be justified under this heading as the competing values 
that are protected by such limitations "are seen as predominating over freedom of 
speech."21 Despite the fact that this almost presumption in favour of competing 
rights, the New Zealand statutory scheme goes on to reduce the value of a right 
that "is as wide as human thought and imagination"22 even further: section 4 (the 
14 For example, between the content and functional aspects of speech. See generally Universal City 
Studios, Inc. et al v Corley and 2600 Enterprises Inc. (2001) 273 F 3d 429, 445-455 (2nd Cir) and 
15 Miller v California (1973) 413 US 15 
16 New Zealand Bill of Rights Acts 3 
17 For example, see cases below: in regards defamation Lange v Atkinson below n 32 and in 
regards intellectual property PC Direct v Best Buys below n 44 
18 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16 
19 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd (2000) 6 HRNZ 1, 16 
20 Moonen above n 18, 16, explaining the s 5 test of the Bill of Rights 
21 Moon en above n 18, 15-16 
22 Moonen above n 18, 15 
5 
"inferiority" provision) states that contrary laws are to prevail, even where they 
breach guaranteed rights. Thus the freedom of speech would seem to become a 
mere principle of interpretation as 
section 6 of the Bill of Rights requires that where an enactment can be 
given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in 
the Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other. Thus if there 
are two tenable meanings, the one which is most in harmony with the Bill 
of Rights must be adopted. 23 
This mere interpretation approach would lead to very little rights enforcement it 
the rights involved were treated "strongly" or as close to absolute. Laws that ap-
pear to infringe rights would inevitably do so it the right was given wide expanse 
or scope. Since any conflict would see the contrary law prevail, it is perhaps 
counter-productive to define rights broadly. 
Section 5 of the Bill of Rights states: 
5. Justified limitations- Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the 
rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights many be subject only to 
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society. 
It is clear then that the rights contained in the Bill of Rights are not absolute. 
However the true significance of section 5 does not lie in its express acknowl-
edgment of the ability for the abrogation of rights. The United States Constitution 
contains no equivalent provision, yet none consider the rights contained therein as 
totally absolute.24 The true worth to New Zealand of section 5 lies in its relation-
ship with sections 4 and 6, the "inferiority" and "interpretation" sections respec-
tively. Section 4 provides that even where other enactments are contrary to guar-
anteed rights, the contrary enactment prevails. In light of this, section 6 states that 
when there is an ambiguity in the language of another enactment, the interpreta-
tion that infringes guaranteed rights the least is to be preferred. It would therefore 
23 
Moonen above n 18, 16 
24 
For example see Miller v California above n 15 
6 
seem as though ambiguity in other enactments is required before the Bill of 
Rights would have any effect: if no "fuzzy" interpretations are available then 
contrary rights-infringing sections must prevail. However, section 5 provides the 
courts with the ability to give the Bill of Rights a more expansive application: by 
limiting a right to the degree where it is no longer contradictory with the infring-
ing provision it is then possible to read in a more limited form of the right without 
triggering section 4. An absolute right would be contrary to many other statutes, 
and hence have no effect on the infringing law. A more limited form of the right 
may not be contradictory to the opposing statute, and hence is able to be "inter-
preted" in. Thus in Ministry of Transport v Noort25 the Transport Act 1962 pro-
vided for immediate breath and blood testing in the case of drink driving.26 These 
are clearly inconsistent with the potentially time consuming right to consult a 
lawyer.27 The Court of Appeal acknowledged that an absolute right to consult 
would be defeated by the Transport Act, however, by limiting the right to consult 
a lawyer within a reasonable time, a reasonable limit that is demonstrably justi-
fied in a free and democratic society (section 5), the right is apparently no longer 
inconsistent. Some rights protection is thereby afforded. 
The net result is that New Zealand law remains largely unaffected in a purist 
sense: concepts such as defamation and censorship have not been fundamentally 
altered as in other jurisdictions with more robust protections, as ultimately they 
are seen as justified limitations. However, there is a strong undercurrent of rights 
protection. With recent emphases on alternate remedies,28 and the potential of 
declarations of inconsistency,29 the New Zealand courts have paved the way for a 
greater consideration of free speech in the New Zealand context. 
25 [1992) 3 NZLR 260 
26 
SS 58B, 58C, 58D 
27 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Acts 23(l)(b) 
28 R v Shaheed [2002) 2 NZLR 377 
29 
Manga v Attorney-General (1999) 5 HRNZ 177; Dunlea v Attorney-General [2000] 3 NZLR 
136 
7 
III ACCEPTED LIMITATIONS TO FREE SPEECH 
There are various doctrines that are accepted limitations to the concept of free 
speech. This is of fundamental necessity to prevent the abuse of such a right, al-
lowing it to be used to attack other, equally fundamental rights. Not even the most 
fanatical free speech proponent would argue that anyone should be able to say ab-
solutely anything about anyone at any time. Although doing so may abuse other 
equally important rights, to extend free speech this far would also render it mean-
ingless. If journalists and tabloid-mongers were free to print anything they wanted 
it would soon become difficult to tell what is true and what is false. Those using 
the right for their own ends could swamp those who wish to make genuine use of 
the guaranteed right. Furthermore, truth in itself has its own conceptual worth. 30 
A Defamation 
The tort of defamation is perhaps one of the oldest restrictions on the general right 
to speak one's mind. It is not permissible to damage the reputation of another by 
means of false and malicious communications that expose that person to con-
tempt, ridicule, hatred, or social ostracism by right-thinking members of the 
· 31 community. 
There has recently been some agitation to acknowledge the role that free speech 
has to play in defamation. Formerly, it did not matter what role the person de-
famed occupied. However, recent developments have acknowledged that there 
may be a greater need to accept that there is a legitimate public interest in some 
(especially political) figures. This has taken place in New Zealand with the Lange 
v Atkinson32 decisions, where the defence of qualified privilege was extended. On 
the facts of the case, the Court of Appeal accepted that there may be a legitimate 
wider public interest in regards the activities of high political officers, even 
30 See, for example, Immanuel Kant's moral philosophies: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten 
(Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals) (1785) and the Kritik der practischen Vernunft 
(Critique of Practical Reason) (1788). 
31 Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105; 151 ER 340; Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237; 
Defamation Act 1992 (NZ) 
32 [1998] 3 NZLR 424 (CA); [2000] l NZLR 257 (PC); [2000] 3 NZLR 385 (CA) 
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though it was outside the traditional Watt v Longsdon33 duty-interest correlation. 
The Court of Appeal has not definitively answered the exact role that free speech 
has to play in defamation.34 
B Intellectual Property 
Intellectual property occupies a peculiar place in the legal hierarchy. Property 
rights are the strongest form of rights known to the common law,35 yet in this par-
ticular instance they are assigned to very much intangible ideas, ideas that can be 
expressed via "speech." Since property rights are so very strong, they constitute 
among the greatest limitations upon the freedom of speech. 
1 Copyright 
The Copyright Act 1994 grants copyright in original works of certain types36 for 
the duration of the author's lifetime, plus fifty years.37 This means that the author 
has exclusive rights during that period to copy, perform, play, show, broadcast or 
adapt the work.38 Admittedly the limitation on the freedom of speech is restricted 
to the scope of the specific work, however, within that scope, the limitation is al-
most total (unless there is a specific narrow exception, for example, sections 41, 
42 and 43). 
Despite this there has been some movements to acknowledge a role for free 
speech in regards copyright. In the English case of Hyde Park Residence Ltd v 
Yelland, 39 a case that arose out of the media interest subsequent to the death of 
Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed, the English Court of Appeal were willing to take 
into account a "public interest" defence in an action for breach of copyright. In the 
past this has taken place in the courts refusing to enforce copyright if the works in 
33 [1930] I KB 130 
34 
See especially the first Court of Appeal decision [1998] 3 NZLR 424 (CA) 
35 "Ownership" consists of a bundle of innumerable rights over property, and not to be conceived 
as existing separately, but as one general right. Ownership is among the greatest forms of control 
the common law can grant over an item. (Halsbury's Laws of England (4 th Ed Reissue) vol 35 para 
1227 and following). 
36 Copyright Act 1994 s 14 
37 
Copyright Act 1994 s 22 
38 
Copyright Act 1994 s 15 
39 
[2000] RPC 604 (UK) 
9 
question were defamatory, immoral, obscene, scandalous or irreligious.40 The 
judges in the Court of Appeal were unwilling to define the public interest defence 
fully, and indeed thought that the circumstances in which it may arise were inca-
pable of precise categorisation.41 Although this is seemingly more focused on the 
notion that enforcing the copyright will cause actual injury to the public well-
being, it seems possible to conceive of an instance where the public may suffer 
some harm to their right to free expression (and its concomitant right to be in-
formed, at least in regard certain matters) by enforcing the copyright. It may there-
fore develop along the lines of the defamation qualified privilege defence. An ob-
vious example is where a politician is trying to prevent the press releasing a 
document on the basis of breach of copyright. A court may refuse to uphold the 
copyright if there is a legitimate public interest in the contents of the document. 
2 Trademarks and Passing Off 
The Trademarks Act 1953 gives the registered proprietor of a specific trademark 
the exclusive right to use such a trademark in the course of the trade for which it 
is registered.42 Thus no one else is entitled to infringe upon that trademark -
which basically amounts to any use of that specific mark. Related to trademarks is 
the tort of passing off, which prohibits misrepresentations in the course of trade 
that are such that harm to the trade of another is reasonably foreseeable. 43 Under 
this tort it is not possible, for example, to say things that are likely to make cus-
tomers believe that your goods are the goods of another. 
There is less scope for freedom of speech in relation to trademarks than copyright, 
since by definition a trademark is a far more limited form of "speech," usually 
consisting of a simple "mark." Nevertheless, the right to free speech has been in-
voked in the course of trademark actions. In the High Court case of PC Direct v 
Best Buys44 the defendant company had conducted a "comparative advertising" 
40 
Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84. However this case was dealing with an interlocutory 
injunction application and hence may be of limited precedent value. 
41 
Hubbard v Vosper above n 40, per Aldous LJ (Stuart-Smith LJ concurring) , para 66; per Mance 
LJ, para 83 
42 
SS 8 & 9 
43 
Warnick v Townend & Sons [ 1979] AC 73 ("The Advocaat Case") 
44 
[ 1997] 2 NZLR 723 
10 
campaign, whereby they presented their own product in comparison with that of 
the plaintiff. They compared the two products in terms of performance and price, 
with the result being a favourable impression of the defendant's goods. However, 
in doing so they used the plaintiff's trademark, who subsequently brought an in-
terlocutory injunction claim, seeking to prevent the defendant's from further us-
age of their trademark. Elias J (as she was then) declined to grant the injunction 
on the basis that an interim relief application requires the balance of convenience 
to clearly favour the plaintiff.45 However she went on to state that the Bill of 
Rights free speech guarantee adds extra weight in favour of the defendant when 
considering where the balance of convenience lies.46 
C Censorship 
In addition to the competing rights of other individuals as have been outlined 
above, there may be a general right on the part of society not to have some par-
ticular sorts of things "expressed." In New Zealand, the Films, Videos, and Publi-
cations Classification Act 1993 (FVPCA) governs the control of objectionable 
material. Unlike the United States, where the community-based Miller47 test ap-
plies, New Zealand has a statutorily defined meaning of objectionability.48 The 
Act also sets up central Classification Office that is able to give exclusive ratings 
to publications. The Classification Office is able to decide whether any given 
material meets the section 3 definition, and such decisions are decisive.49 Hence 
judicial or individual opinion is irrelevant. 
Section 3 states that material is deemed to be objectionable if certain criteria are 
fulfilled, 50 while certain other criteria are to be given great weight in determining 
45 
Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 140 
46 
PC Direct v Best Buys above n 44, 733 
41 
Miller v California above n 15; this test allows individual communities to determine their own 
standard for obscenity or objectionability. Thus the standard of obscenity will vary from place to 
Psl:c;.Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 
49 
s 4 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 
50 
s 3(2), for such grounds as bestiality (para (e)), necrophilia (para (c)) and sexual exploitation of 
children (para (a)). 
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objectionability,51 and still other criteria are to be considered.52 Furthermore, a 
restricted publication becomes treated as if it were objectionable if it breaches its 
restrictions. 53 
The Act then goes on to make various acts dealing with objectionable material 
(including making, or for the purpose of supply, copying, distributing, displaying, 
exhibiting, advertising or otherwise making available54) illegal. A further factor is 
that it does not matter whether the person dealing in objectionable material actu-
ally knows that it is objectionable. It is possible for material to be submitted to the 
Classification Office after someone has been arrested for possession of it. Since 
the Classification Office is given the exclusive power to classify a document, if a 
person appears before a court on charges for potential breach of the FVPCA, the 
court is obliged to refer any previously unclassified material to the Classification 
Office. Hence knowledge of objectionability is not required to breach the Act. 
However, if the person does (or ought reasonably to) know that the material is 
objectionable, he becomes subject to harsher penalties. Finally, to round out the 
seemingly draconian measures of the statute, section 131 makes it an offence for 
simple possession of objectionable material, and moreover, like the other of-
fences, one is not required to have knowledge of its objectionability. The com-
bined effect of a long and reasonably convoluted section and potentially "retro-
spective" classifications lead to a very difficult scenario in regards free speech.55 
Thus it may seem as though free speech is held in very little esteem in New 
Zealand, at least in regards censorship. This would seem to be reinforced by some 
recent decisions in regards classifications. The French film Baise-Moi was banned 
from New Zealand screens following an appeal of its R18 classification, despite 
51 
s 3(3), factors such as degrading or dehumanising sexual conduct (para (c)) or encouraging 
criminal acts (para (d)) . 
52 s 3(4), factors such as the "dominant effect of the publication as a whole" (para (a)) and whether 
the publication has any redeeming social features (para (c)). 
53 
SS 125 & 126 
54 
SS 123 & 124 
55 
For further discussion of the problems with this legislative framework see Dean Knight "An 
Objectionable Offence: A Critique of the Possession Offence in the Films, Videos, and 
Publications Classification Act 1993" (1997) 27 VUWLR 451 
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some critical acclaim.56 Two Eminem albums, "The Slim Shady LP" and "The 
Marshall Mathers LP" were given R18 classifications owing to the nature of the 
lyrics despite the fact that 
and 
[t]he recording undoubtedly has artistic merit. Critics praise Eminem for its 
dark humour, deft rhyming and metaphorical dexterity . .. Even critics who 
deprecate the violence and misogyny in the lyrics admit they are clever and 
infectiously humorous .. . Eminem .. . has some claim to cultural merit and 
social importance . .. 57 
"[t]he album has artistic merit. The lyrics are clever and inventive. Review-
ers praise Eminem as a "deft wordsmith," "a strong storyteller and master of 
the metaphor." The album is a work of self-expression . .. It does have musi-
cal worth. Critics generally praise its musical qualities .. . "58 
Despite the endorsements of artistic merit, both albums were subject to restriction. 
This means that it is an offence punishable by up to $10,000 for and individual or 
$25,000 for a body corporate59 to supply, distribute, exhibit, display, or otherwise 
deal with a restricted publication otherwise than in accordance with the classifica-
tion.60 Thus a parent whose under-eighteen child is a budding musician would be 
potentially liable if they wish their child to hear the album, and so buy (or even 
play) it for them. 
In both decisions, merely a token reference is made to the Bill of Rights Act, sim-
ply stating the relevant sections without any true analysis. However, the Court of 
56 "Perverts and censors have a great deal in common" New Zealand Herald, 22 July 2002; 
available at the New Zealand Herald's web-site: 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?thesection=news&thesubsection=&storyID=209875 
5> (last accessed 26 September 2002) 
57 Eminem: The Slim Shady LP (10 September 1999) unreported, Film, Video and Publication 
Classification Office, OFLC Ref: 9900817, 13 
58 Eminem: The Marshall Mathers LP (6 December 2000) unreported, Film, Video and Publication 
Classification Office, OFLC Ref: 1281, 13 
59 
Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Acts 126(2)(a) and (b) respectively. It would be 
an offence under this section (requiring knowledge) as an effect of this classification is that all 
albums must be sold with an "Rl 8" sticker. Even without the sticker, the publicity surrounding the 
album is such that a reasonable person ought to know of its classification. 
60 
Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Acts 125(l)(a) 
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Appeal has reinforced the need for the right of freedom of expression to be taken 
into account when determining what is objectionable. Thus the Court of Appeal 
placed particular emphasis on "promotes or supports" for the purposes of subsec-
tion (2), stating that "[t]here must be something about the way the prohibited ac-
tivity is described, depicted or otherwise dealt with , which can fairly be said to 
have the effect of promoting or supporting that activity."61 Thus an Act that seeks 
to limit freedom of speech (via an objectionable classification) is construed as nar-
rowly as possible so as to create the least possible restriction on the right. 
D Court Ordered Suppression 
This is possibly one of the most topical free speech issues in New Zealand at the 
moment. It has recently come to prominence in the "American Billionaire"62 and 
"Mr X Kidnapping" cases.63 The power of the court to order name or detail 
suppression is found in section 140 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985: 
140. Court may prohibit publication of names-
(!) Except as otherwise expressly provided in any enactment, a court may 
make an order prohibiting the publication, in any report or account relating 
to any proceedings in respect of an offence, of the name, address, or occu-
pation of the person accused or convicted of the offence, or of any other 
person connected with the proceedings, or any particulars likely to lead to 
any such person's identification. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests a high incidence of name suppression m New 
Zealand.64 Furthermore, names are suppressed on an interim basis even if a judge 
declines to apply section 140 pending appeal of that decision. This is perhaps too 
61 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review above n 18, 19 
62 Ultimately decided in the Court of Appeal as Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd above n 19 
63 "Wellington lawyer facing attempted kidnap charge" New Zealand Herald , 25 July 2002; 
available on the New Zealand Herald's web-site: 
<http://www.nzherald .co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?thesection=news&thesubsection=&storyID=2l9709 
5> (last accessed 29 September 2002) 
64 
Recent figures for name suppression were unable to be obtained. However a search of the New 
Zealand Herald web-site (<http://www.nzherald.co.nz> (last accessed 29 September 2002) 
revealed that in the last year (28 September 2001 - 27 September 2002) 537 newsworthy cases 
featured names or reasons that were suppressed. Although some of these stories feature the same 
case, other cases in which name suppression has been granted would not have been deemed 
newsworthy. This amounts to approximately two suppressions per day of court sittings. 
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ready an application. Open justice demands freedom of speech, and suppression 
should be for worthy cases, either where the victim or accused (if acquitted) 
would face social stigma from court proceedings. 
In the two above cases, and in several other high-profile instances, suppression 
orders have sought to be challenged by parts of the media. In Lewis v Wilson & 
Horton Ltd,65 (the American Billionaire Case), the New Zealand Herald chal-
lenged the suppression and the Court of Appeal ultimately ruled that the suppres-
sion order could not have been justified on the facts before the District Court 
(hence an error of law occurred), and so quashed the suppression. However, they 
also emphasised that although there is a prima facie presumption in favour of 
openness of reporting, this presumption can be displaced if there is sufficient 
weight in favour of suppression. Factors to be considered include the ultimate de-
termination of the case, the seriousness of offending, adverse impacts on the pros-
pects for rehabilitation, the public interest and personal circumstances.66 These 
factors do not only apply to accused, but to any persons involved in court pro-
ceedings. 
It can be considered the scope of court ordered suppression is too wide. Granting 
suppression too readily undermines the cases that genuinely require suppression. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Court of Appeal ruled that there was a fundamental 
error in law in granting the suppression only when someone (and that a newspa-
per) was sufficiently concerned to challenge it. How many cases must pass with 
suppression where it is not challenged? This is quite in contrast to the American 
scenario, where bodies such as the American Civil Liberties Union routinely 
challenge acts that are seen to infringe on human rights guarantees. 
Although there are some definite anomalies, the current state of free speech law in 
New Zealand generally is inclined toward the maintenance of traditional limita-
tions, as they are justifiable in a free and democratic society. Nevertheless there is 
65 above n 19 
66 
Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd, above n 19, 16 
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a strong undercurrent of the promotion of free speech. However, this present 
situation is under serious attack from the internet and its developing technologies. 
IV WHAT IS THE "INTERNET?" 
The internet is a worldwide system of interconnected computer networks - a net-
work of networks. Users of any one computer can, if they have permission, get 
information from any other computer (and sometimes talk directly to users at 
other computers). The United States government Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (ARPA) first conceived of the idea in 1969 and hence the internet was 
first known as the ARPANET. This was originally designed to allow communica-
tion between the military, defence contractors, and universities. Until this point, 
communications had been limited to "peer-to-peer" contact, a direct line the same 
as a phone call. The new system on the other hand connected many different 
computers at once.67 
This was made technologically feasible through the use of "packets." Although 
the internet uses the currently existing public telecommunication networks, the 
data travels fundamentally differently. In existing telecommunications, the data 
travels as a continuous stream. If the stream is interrupted or unable to flow in its 
intended route, it will fail. However, using the internet, any given file that is 
sought to be transmitted is divided into many of these small packets, transmitted, 
and then reassembled at the other end.68 Packets can be transmitted via a 
multiplicity of routes, and automatically be routed and rerouted. Hence the net-
work could continue to function even if parts of it were malfunctioning or de-
stroyed in the event of a military attack or other natural disaster (hence its value to 
the military). It was designed to be a "decentralised, self-maintaining series of re-
dundant links between computers and computer networks."69 As a result, no user 
of the internet necessarily knows the location of another, even if they are in 
67 Reno v A CLU ( 1997) 521 US 844, 850; 117 S Ct 2329, 2334; 138 L Ed 2d 87 4, 884 
68 whatis?com <http://www.whatis.techtarget.com> "packet" definition 
<http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,,sid7 _gci212736,00.html> (last updated 31 
July 2001) 
69 
ACLU v Reno (1996) 929 F Supp 824, 831 (ED Pa) 
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"direct" contact. Furthermore, nobody would (perhaps even could) know the route 
any given piece of data had travelled. 
Non-military networks following similar principles began to emerge, linking 
businesses, universities, and individuals worldwide. Eventually these combined, 
to become what we know as the "internet." Although these various networks 
contain communications links, they all operate independently of each other. There 
is "no centralized storage location, control point, or communications channel for 
the internet, and it would not be technically feasible for a single entity to control 
all of the information conveyed on the internet."70 
Given this, how is it possible for the internet to function at all? There is a diverse 
number of networks, all doing different things. The answer lies in the use of 
"protocols." These are commonly accepted methods of data exchange, voluntarily 
adopted by the various networks in order to make the internet functionally viable. 
The division, transmission and reassembly of packet data is governed by the use 
of these protocols.71 The fundamental protocol of the internet is the TCP/IP 
Protocol Suite (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol), a derivation 
from two of the original protocols.72 Without this accepted method, the internet 
simply would not function. 
The most widely used part of the internet is the World Wide Web. Literally mil-
lions of people "surf' or "browse" the "web" every day. It popularity lies in its 
simplicity and intuitive nature, which is enabled by the use of hypertext. Informa-
tion appears in web "pages," and virtually all of these pages contain hypertext 
"links" (often differentiated by colour or the like), which when "clicked" provide 
instant access to the location of the information or file desired. This method of 
70 
ACLU v Reno above n 69, 832 
71 
whatis?com<http://www.whatis.techtarget.com> "protocol" definition 
<http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,,sid7 _gci2 l 2839 ,00.html> (last updated 10 
September 2002) 
72 whatis?com <http://www.whatis .techtarget.com> "TCP/IP" definition 
<http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid7 _gci214173,00.html> (last updated 29 
August 2001) 
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instant cross-referencing of pages is enabled by the use of another protocol, the 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP).73 
Although the internet is often thought of synonymously with its most widely used 
application, the World Wide Web, it has also has many others. The use of e-mail 
(governed by another set of protocols, the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) 
and Post Office Protocol 3 (POP3) for sending and receiving respectively) has 
largely replaced hard copy mail.74 It is also possible to "chat" using the Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC) protocol, carrying on real time conversations with other users.75 
Usenet is a collection of user-submitted messages on various subjects (known as 
"newsgroups") that are posted to servers on a worldwide network. For this the 
Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) is used.76 
V INTERNETFEATURESTHATAFFECTFREESPEECH 
The internet presents fundamental changes to the way we must consider freedom 
of speech and the accepted limitations that have been placed upon it in our soci-
ety. 
A Technological 
The first change that the internet presents stems from the fundamental way it op-
erates. Data travels in tiny packets, consisting often of little more than binary code 
(ones and zeroes). In transit, this packet data makes no discernable sense. It is 
only once the data has been reassembled at its destination that it becomes coher-
ent. Furthermore, even inspecting all the packets and reassembling them before 
73 whatis?com <http://www.whatis.techtarget.com> "HTTP" definition 
<http:// searchs ystemsmanagement. techtarget.corn/ sDefi n i ti on/0, ,s id20 _gci2 l 4004 ,00. html> ( last 
updated 5 October 2000) 
7 whatis?com <http://www.whatis.techtarget.com> "e-Mail" definition 
<http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,,sid7 _gci21205 l ,OO.html> (last updated 5 
November 2001) 
75 
whatis?com <http://www.whatis.techtarget.com> "chatting" definition 
<http://searchwebservices. techtarget.corn/sDefinition/O,,sid26_gci2 l l 777 ,00.html> (last updated 
12 June 20011) 
76 
whatis?com <http://www.whatis.techtarget.com> "Usenet" definition 
<http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,,sid7 __gci2 l 3262,00.htm1> (la t updated 3 
July 2001) 
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they reach their destination may be impossible as the various packets may travel 
by various routes as parts of their path become inaccessible. Thus unlike "real" or 
physical information or content that is being sent, it is largely impossible to in-
spect en route. Thus any controls or limitations that are sought to be put in place 
must occur either at the source or at the destination. This is somewhat like having 
the postal services inspect mail at its point of departure and arrival, rather than the 
customs services that inspect packages entering the country for local compliance. 
Furthermore, although some technical control measures for content presently ex-
ist, they are largely inadequate. "Filters" are programs that run automatically, 
checking data that is attempted to be downloaded.77 There are two main ways in 
which a filter may operate: firstly, in screening for specific words. Typically these 
filters are designed to combat objectionable content such as pornography, rather 
than for other issues identified in this paper such as defamatory or copyright-
infringing data. Therefore, this type of filter will typically prevent web pages be-
ing displayed that contain the words such as "sex."78 However, this type of filter, 
although simple in execution, suffers from some serious flaws. Firstly, and most 
obviously, it cannot scan pictures. This is often seen as the most objectionable 
form of content, and so pages that do not contain the screened-for words may be 
accessible. Secondly, the system has problems of overbreadth. Although it will 
block adult sites, it may also block the tourist looking for information on Essex. 
Furthermore, it will also block some sites that are seen as socially redeeming. For 
example, a site that seeks to promote safe sex. 
The second sort of filter blocks specific web-sites. Each site contains a specific 
address called a Uniform Resource Locator (URL), and this filter works by pre-
venting access to any page with that URL.79 Although again simple, it also has 
some serious flaws. Firstly, it is reliant on the filter program remaining up-to-date 
with all objectionable UR.Ls. It was estimated in 1998 that there were 60,000 adult 
web-sites in the United States, with a growth in revenue in the vicinity of 40 per 
77 
whatis?com<http://www.whatis.techtarget.com> "Filter" definition 
<http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/O,,sid9 _gci21212 l ,OO.html> (last updated 18 April 2002) 
78 
above n 77 
79 
above n 77 
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cent annually (although growth is predicted to decline).80 With this program being 
reliant on the user constantly up-dating the software, it is obvious that not all ob-
jectionable sites will be blocked. There is also the problem of older URLs being 
reassigned to other web-sites that people may wish to have access to. Finally there 
is an issue that arose in Mainstream Loudoun v Board of Trustees of the Loudoun 
County Library81 of some URLs being wrongly blocked. 
Filters are also only effective (and even here questionably) in regards adult con-
tent. They are really only designed to prevent minors from accessing restricted 
material. It does not matter whether it is what we would class as totally objection-
able, or merely catering to an adult market for titillation. Obviously filters have no 
effect on copyrights, other intellectual property or suppression orders. 
Finally, like all "self-help" measures, the effectiveness of filters depends on peo-
ple installing and maintaining them. Popular culture tends to state that it is chil-
dren that predominantly use the internet, while their parents remain computer-
illiterate. A computer-savvy child could quite easily disable any filter and look at 
anything they want to. While this may be overstated, it does rely on parents being 
proactive and continuing to monitor their children's computer use. 
B Jurisdictional Issues 
Perhaps one of the greatest challenges the internet poses to the regulation of 
"speech" is the fact that it is truly international in nature. Obviously New Zealand 
laws will only apply to people within New Zealand's jurisdiction. If a foreign 
web-site has material on it that would be contrary to New Zealand law, but per-
fectly within the realms of its domestic law, there is little that New Zealand au-
thorities can do about it unless someone within New Zealand accesses it. Even at 
this point the only action that can be taken is against the New Zealand individual 
who accesses it, assuming such access is against the law (like in the case of 
80 
"Online Porn Industry Facing Crisis" Broadcasting & Cable Online, 5 November 1998; 
<http://www.broadcastingcable.com>; also available at 
<http://www.nua.com/surveys/index.cgi?f=VS&art_id=905354484&rel=true> (last accessed 28 
September 2002) 
81 
(1998) 24 F Supp 2d 552 (ED Va) 
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censorship). This makes control difficult as it is virtually impossible to monitor 
the flow of data into the country (see above). Prosecutions are on an individual 
basis, and occur either from informants or active police "under-cover" opera-
tions.82 Even when laws are not in conflict and the activities of a web-site breach 
the Jaw of both New Zealand and the domestic country in which the service is 
based, New Zealand law enforcers have no jurisdiction in foreign countries. 
Hence preventing the illegality continuing relies on informing the other nation and 
relying on them to take appropriate actions. 
C "Distributor-less" nature of the internet 
The internet is distinct from the off-line world in that large quantities of material 
can travel efficiently from source to ultimate destination without a network or 
chain of distributors. In the case of other unlawful activities that originate off-
shore, for example, drug-trafficking, there is typically a New Zealand "source" 
who acts as the first receiver for the goods as they enter the country. He or she 
will then typically pass on the goods to others who act as distributors. On the 
other hand, using the internet the unlawful product moves directly to its destina-
tion. For other forms of importing it is possible to "cut the head off the snake," 
attacking the problem at its (local) origin. This is not possible for the internet, and 
as a result any prosecutions or actions must be brought at a highly individualised 
and diversified level. 
D Size 
Although not a problem unique to the internet, problems that relate to the sheer 
size have been taken to a new level. The internet is currently estimated to have 
580.78 million users,83 up from only an estimated 26 million in 1995,84 and will 
only grow further. 
82 
For example, as occurred in the Merry case - see below n 89 
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21 
E Anonymity 
As a result of the packet form of data transfer, it is very easy to use the internet 
anonymously. It is hard for someone to trace the source (or the destination) of any 
particular piece of information. This makes traditional after-the-event prosecu-
tions or civil actions difficult, as there may be no way of locating the potential de-
fendant. 
F Dichotomous Nature 
The previous problems outlined relate to free speech issues in regards difficulties 
with limitations upon the right. The dichotomous nature of the internet can also 
attack the notions of free speech directly. At one level the internet is associated 
with a vast boundary-less sea of information out in cyberspace, and this is accu-
rate to a degree. However, at another distinct level this vast ethereal sea is con-
tained physically on computers, located in various countries. Although free speech 
is generally recognised (in the West at least) as a universal right, the scope of that 
right differs enormously. Local service providers are subject to local laws. When 
foreign users of the internet access sites subject to differing laws from their own, 
they are importing that law to a degree to their own country. As has been stated, it 
is difficult for authorities to control internet data as it flows in. However, it is not 
so difficult to control the data contained on machines within one's country, as 
prosecution for breach of domestic laws is possible. Thus the laws of the jurisdic-
tion that contains the server a user is accessing become by default the laws of that 
user, at least for as long as that data is being accessed. 
Suppose a New Zealander accesses material on an Australian web-site, material 
that is illegal in both countries. Although New Zealand authorities cannot prose-
cute the Australian site, they can notify the Australian police, who will take their 
own action. On the other hand, if the material were contained on an American 
web-site, and owing to the broader American free speech protection is not illegal 
there, nothing could be done except to prosecute any New Zealander who was 
caught with such material. The web-site itself would be immune from liability or 
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sanction. They are acting within the law in their own locality, and are outside the 
jurisdiction of New Zealand law. Therefore, American free speech law has a sig-
nificant bearing on the laws of New Zealand too. 
This problem is further compounded by the fact that free speech is a constitu-
tional-type guarantee. Similar arguments to that made above could also be made 
in regards tort, criminal law and contract. Suppose America and New Zealand had 
different rules for contract acceptance. A New Zealander accepting an American 
contract would be "importing" American law temporarily. However, it is probably 
ultimately possible to reach a form of consensus internationally over what consti-
tutes various forms of (non-constitutional) actions and laws. This has occurred in 
such areas as contract. 85 However, constitutional matters are more fundamental. 
There is little chance that America would be willing to adopt a lesser form of free 
speech protection than currently exists, and equally unlikely is the possibility that 
New Zealand would accept a much stronger right. Thus there is a fundamental 
schism between the laws of the nations that govern the web-servers, and the inter-
national, boundary-less realm of cyberspace. 
VI DEFAMATION ON THE INTERNET 
Turning now to how the internet and its technologies alter the presently existing 
law. The data transfer technology of the internet does not play a significant role in 
defamation, since the objection is generally not the fact that a defamatory state-
ment has entered a particular jurisdiction, rather that it has been made at all. The 
distributor-less nature of the material is also not of particular relevance, since it is 
the defamer that is subject to a lawsuit. 
On the other hand, jurisdiction and anonymity are important issues. Obviously it 
is impossible to sue for a defamatory statement if the defamer is unknown, and the 
internet provides wide scope for this . It is very easy to post anonymous defama-
tory statements on a variety of internet provided services. On the other hand, it is 
85 For example, the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts ((1995) BDIEL AD 
LEXIS 87) and the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods ((1985) 24 ILM 1574; (1991 ) BDIEL AD LEXIS 29) 
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sometimes possible to sue the provider of such a service, the web-site itself, as the 
"publisher" of the statement. This has occurred in the CompuServe86 line of cases. 
This case was a landmark decision being one of the first to consider on-line liabil-
ity. In this case, defamatory material was posted on the defendant's message sys-
tem. However, owing to the lack of control by the defendant, there was no liabil-
ity. The court described the defendant as a mere distributor, not a publisher. The 
later Netcom87 case developed this idea into what became known as the "passive 
conduit" approach. This remains the law today, and is the nominal basis on which 
file trading sites such as Napster operate: if the site does not breach the law itself, 
merely its users, it should be exempt from liability. On the other hand, although it 
has not occurred specifically in the defamation context, if the defendant plays any 
active role, such as copying data itself,88 or cataloguing or censoring (inade-
quately) material. 89 
This shows the paradoxical nature of current laws as distorted by the internet. If a 
web-site takes precautions to try and prevent offending material of this sort, then 
it may be liable under the mantra of playing an active role (also known as "as-
sumed responsibility"). On the other hand, if a web-site becomes a "free-for-all" 
forum, then the site itself can have no legal liability as a mere distributor. This is a 
problem peculiar to the common law, and has arisen elsewhere. For example, the 
common law traditionally imposed no obligation to stop and help the injured per-
son on the road-site, but if you did stop and attempt to help, but did so inade-
quately, then liability may result. However, the use of this method of thinking is 
particularly unsuited for the internet. The need to scrutinise every message before 
it is published is physically unnecessary on automated message sites - a user sim-
ply types a message, presses enter, and it is posted for the entire world to see. This 
contrasts to traditional print media, such as "Letters to the Editor" in newspapers, 
where at bare minimum it is necessary to re-enter the letter for printing. 
86 Cubby Inc. v CompuServe Inc. (1991) 776 F Supp 135 (SD NY) 
87 Religious Technology Centre v Netcom On-Line Communication Services Inc. (1995) 904 F 
Supp 1361 (ND Cal) 
88 This is the basis for Napter's liability, see A & M Records v Napster (2002) 284 F 3d 1091 (9 th 
Cir) 
89 This first occurred in Playboy Enterprises Inc. v Webbworld Inc. (1991) 991 F Supp 543 (ND 
Tex) in regards copyright infringement. It has occurred in New Zealand in the criminal sphere in 
Department of Internal Affairs v Merry (2000) NZDCR LEXIS 28 
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Furthermore, the ease and popularity of such a service (related to the sheer size of 
the internet) inevitably leads to a massive increase in the volume of messages. 
Hence it might be impracticable to screen every message for defamatory state-
ments. But if a web-site decides to be responsible and install a filtering system 
(that may, for example, censor messages with swear words), but the system for 
checking does Jet defamatory messages through, then liability may result. Thus it 
is more logical for a provider of internet services simply not to have any screening 
program whatsoever. Not only does this prevent potential liability in lawsuits, but 
also avoids the need for the mundane expense of filter software. However, al-
though it would be impossible to prevent everything, most modern filter programs 
are capable of preventing at lease some content. This has been reflected in the 
United States with the Communications Decency Act (CDA)9° that provides a 
"Good Samaritan" defence, exempting from liability web-sites that take all rea-
sonable steps to prevent breaches of law. 91 
These issues would seem to encourage free speech generally, since someone can 
say anything they want without fear of consequence. This sort of free-for-all is not 
"freedom of speech" as a fundamental human right, rather meaningless rumour-
mongering that occurs beyond the boundaries of a lawful society. Free speech is 
not designed to allow a person to defame anyone at any time they wish, but rather 
promote certain other ideals society wishes to encourage, such as free and frank 
political discussion and advancing knowledge and truth. 
However, a problem that affects freedom of speech more specifically is the di-
chotomous nature of the internet and the related issue of jurisdiction. As stated 
above, the internet reaJly exists on two distinct levels, a localised physical reality 
and a boundary-less cyberspace etherealness. The determination of which con-
ceptual level to use ultimately affects the entire course of internet free speech 
thought. The notion that cyberspace imports with it the Jaws of its locality is 
something of a problem for free speech Jaw as we understand it in New Zealand. 
United States defamation law is significantly different from its New Zealand 
90 
(1997) Pub L No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stal 56, 133 
91 
47 uses § 230(ct)(3) 
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counterpart: New York Times v Sullivan92 requires either actual malice or a reck-
less disregard for the truth on the part of a defamer, a far higher standard than 
New Zealand. Assuming an American company publishes a document that de-
fames a New Zealander, it will be difficult for that New Zealander to recover. If 
the document was published in the United States, it has the full benefit of Ameri-
can defamation test. If it is published in New Zealand, New Zealand law will ap-
ply in the domestic suit, but (assuming the publisher has no presence locally that 
actually did the publishing, and hence directly subject to suit within the jurisdic-
tion) in order to have binding effect on the defendant, the judgment needs to be 
enforced by a United States court. This only occurs when the foreign Jaw sought 
to be enforced corresponds with United States Jaw. This occurred in the case of 
Yahoo! Inc v La Ligue Cantre Le Racisme Et l'Antisemitisme93 the plaintiff 
(Yahoo!) sought (and received) an order that a French judgment finding Yahoo! in 
breach of a French Jaw outlawing traffic in Nazi memorabilia (which had been 
placed on Yahoo!'s on-line auction site by a user) was unenforceable in the 
United States as contrary to United States domestic law. The Federal District 
Court refused to enforce the French judgment as it was contrary to United States 
law, and to do otherwise would be to import foreign limitations on free speech. 
Although actually an example specifically relating to censorship Jaw, it also 
shows the general problems with jurisdictional issues. 
Unlike the "real" world, when defamation occurs on the internet, it is debatable 
where "publication" occurs, hence it is arguable which law to apply. It may occur 
when the article is made available on its web-server. On the other hand, it does 
not exist in a readable form until downloaded in the local jurisdiction, hence pub-
lication may not occur until then. Hence the decision on publication, and flowing 
form this, liability, can have profound impacts on the notions of internet-related 
free speech: 
Suppose Forexample.com is an American based web-site that, as a part of its ser-
vices, publishes news articles about famous people. One of these articles is about 
92 (1964) 376 us 254 
93 (2001) 169 F Supp 2d 1181 (ND Cal) 
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Mr Illustration, a New Zealander living in Wellington, but with some notoriety in 
the United States (hence the article). Although Forexample.com is largely based 
in America, placing its articles on servers based there, it also has a related subsidi-
ary, Forexample.co.nz (hence it is directly within the jurisdiction of the New 
Zealand courts). Forexample.com thinks it is secure in its New York Times v 
Sullivan94 constitutional protection. Assuming that the article is defamatory for 
New Zealand purposes, but not for American, ultimately the success or failure of 
Mr Illustration will depend on where (or perhaps when) "publication" occurred. 
If publication is completed when the article is made available on the American 
server, then American law will apply. An off-line analogy that supports this con-
tention is the idea of buying a book in one jurisdiction, taking it to your home in 
another jurisdiction and reading it there, then complaining of the defamation un-
der your local law. In the alternative, if publication is not completed until the re-
quested article is displayed on screen in New Zealand, then New Zealand law will 
apply. This is somewhat analogous to the cross-border letter. If someone know-
ingly sends letters trans-jurisdictionally then they cannot complain about being 
subject to the laws of that foreign jurisdiction. It is at least arguable that both 
analogies apply to the internet. If you place a document on a web-server, then it is 
potentially available to anyone, like a bookstore. In order to view the article, the 
"customer" is required to take active steps to access it - "purchasing" the "book." 
On the other hand, by making the article available to the world, the author must 
also be aware that people in foreign jurisdictions with foreign laws will access it. 
Furthermore, the article does not exist in any readable form until the reader on 
their computer opens it for display - the "envelope" is "opened." 95 
94 above n 92 
95 This scenario has occurred and been considered along these lines in Australia in Gutnick v Dow 
Jones. The plaintiff (Mr Gutnick) brought proceedings in Australia for defamation. The defendant 
sought to strike the case out. The relevant arguments for these purposes was that there was no 
jurisdiction for a Victorian court to hear an action against an American plaintiff and (in a similar 
vein) that Victoria was "forum non conveniens," or not the most appropriate place for the action to 
be brought. The Supreme Court of Victoria (as Gutnick v Dow Jones [2001] VSC 305) and the 
Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal (as Dow Jones v Gutnick [2001] VSCA 249), largely 
adopting the Supreme Court ' s reasoning, rejected these arguments, principally by adopting a letter 
analogy, allowing the suit to continue. Dow Jones has subsequently appealed to the High Court of 
Australia . The decision has been reserved (transcript of arguments: Dow Jones v Gutnick (14 May 
2002) unreported, HCA, M3/2002). 
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Since both alternatives are at least arguably open, the decision of the courts should 
come down to policy. If the court opts for the bookstore analogy, then Mr 
Illustration will have no recourse. Publication occurred in America, and there the 
requirements for defamation are not fulfilled. This affects free speech in the man-
ner that is described above. Since defamation is an accepted limitation to free 
speech, the failure to recognise it also has implications for the right itself. The 
internet becomes a lawless frontier, where you are free to slander anyone, so long 
as they would not be able to bring a suit in your jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, if the judge accepts the letter analogy, then senous conse-
quences may flow for Forexample.com - they will potentially be liable in any 
country with internet access. This leads to some potentially important free speech 
implications. Forexample.com will wish to avoid defamation suits in the future, 
and so have two potential options: Firstly, they can make sure that they follow the 
most generous international defamation laws: if anyone in any country can access 
the site, and potentially sue in domestic defamation, then the only way to avoid 
liability will be to increase the level of self-censorship to excise any statement that 
could possibly be construed as defamatory in whichever country grants the most 
protection for reputation. This is reasonably unpalatable for free speech advocates 
as it will amount to an inversion of the dichotomous nature problem the internet 
presents: instead of exporting American free speech laws, the result will be the 
import of foreign defamation Jaw. In the alternative, it is possible for 
Forexample.com to erect a "firewall," a technological measure (basically a filter 
in reverse) that prevents access without permission. These firewalls can be set to 
exclude users from specific countries, and so would be set to exclude any user in a 
nation with lower standards of defamation (and are willing to hold foreign web-
sites liable) than the United States. This would affect New Zealand free speech, as 
not only the defamatory article would be prevented, but also any other article 
published at Forexample.com. Furthermore, other United States web-sites that be-
come aware of potential international liability would also move to erect similar 
blockades, seriously infringing the right of New Zealanders to receive informa-
tion. 
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Ultimately both outcomes are equally unpalatable, and the only true method 
would be to strike out in a new direction. Rather than use analogies such as books 
and letters to try and force-fit existing law to a new and unsuitable scenario, with 
potentially serious consequences for free speech regardless of the way the policy 
question is ultimately decided, it may be better to create a new internet law spe-
cifically tailored to the situation. Perhaps the best way is to take an entirely new 
approach. The most likely method seems to be that of catering to the web service 
providers' self interest, for example, the "Good Samaritan" defence provided by 
the CDA.96 If internet services can exempt themselves from potential liability by 
introducing approved controls, then they will typically do so. By encouraging 
web-sites to monitor the content that users post (rather than being mere "passive 
conduits") at least some law infringing material will be prevented. This "encour-
agement" could stem from legislative action, or simply by court process rejecting 
the passive conduit approach as inappropriate for the internet, despite its tradi-
tional common law standing. 
In the alternative, it may be possible for web-sites to absolve themselves of liabil-
ity contractually. Most web-sites already (prominently) display their terms and 
conditions of use, typically stating such things as the material is copyrighted and 
so on, and that continued usage of the web-site constitutes acceptance. This could 
be adapted to other spheres. For example, stating that although the web-site's arti-
cles comply with United States defamation law, if you are accessing them from 
foreign jurisdictions you may be breaching your local defamation Jaw. Further-
more, stating that by continuing to use the web-site you agree to contractually as-
sume liability for "publishing" the article within your jurisdiction. 
If either of these alternatives were adopted, the decision on policy would need to 
come down on the side of web service liability, at least in the individual case. 
Holding web-sites not liable would not provide any rationale for them to adopt 
measures of this sort. 
96 above n 91 
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VII INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET 
A Copyright 
The internet has caused serious problems for copyright law. Digital technologies 
(such as compact disc music and DVD (digital versatile disc) movies) are easily 
copied onto computers, and with the increasing prevalence of high-speed internet 
connections, allegedly exchanged without undue difficulty or cost. 
The technology of the internet allowing data transfer via the packet method is im-
portant: not only is data reliable and of reasonable quality, but it is also not able to 
be monitored in transit, although admittedly, even if it could be, it would be very 
difficult to distinguish between copyright and non-copyright works. The dichoto-
mous nature plays a lesser role than in defamation, largely owing to greater inter-
national accord in copyright law. Jurisdiction also plays a role in that copyright 
infringers that are foreign to the jurisdiction may be far more difficult to prose-
cute. However, by far the greatest problems are in the distributor-less nature, the 
size, and the anonymity features of the internet. 
In the off-line world, copyright infringement is only possible on extremely small 
scales (for example, between friends) unless there is some form of organised net-
work of distribution, such as large scale "pirates" who on-sell mass copied works. 
Typically the former, although difficult to combat, is not of particular concern to 
copyright holders. On the other hand, the latter scenario is of much greater con-
cern, but is far easier to prevent, and where prevention fails, prosecute. It is possi-
ble to eliminate the entire problem by targeting the source of the copies, the origi-
nal "pirate" - it is possible to "cut the head of the snake." 
This would be the situation on the internet if there were a web-site that offered 
infringing works for download. It would be possible to attack the web-site di-
rectly.97 However, the ingenuity of some led to "Napster" and its clones. Someone 
97 
Assuming there was jurisdiction and a defendant to sue. Although not a problem to the same 
degree as defamation, there are some international difficulties. For example, the website 
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using the Napster (or equivalent) software is able to search the hard-drives of oth-
ers that are also on-line and using the program. Users are able to copy files that 
are of interest to them to their own computers. These files can be virtually any-
thing - including music and video. Thus Napster itself did not infringe copyright -
it is merely a "passive conduit," not attempting to monitor the files that flow via 
its service. Thus instead of the web-service breaching copyright, individuals using 
the service were doing so. However, the internet enabled this to become a massive 
problem: the sheer size of the internet created the potential for many users of the 
service, which in tum led to more files being available. Hence the average user 
was able to download large amounts of copyright infringing works, and to do so 
largely anonymously. Rather than one large prosecution, it would be necessary to 
conduct thousands (if not tens of thousands) of small prosecutions to eliminate the 
problem. 
Although the highly publicised Napster98 case ultimately ended in liability for the 
web-service, it was due to the nature of the programming: in order to make 
Napster run more efficiently, the program created a central database of all the files 
that users who were logged onto the Napster service were prepared to trade. Thus 
instead of searching every other hard-drive individually, a user could search a 
central directory. Thus there was sufficient active participation to take Napster 
beyond being a mere passive conduit. Other similar services do exist that seem-
ingly fall outside the law.99 Although copyright is breached, it is done so by 
individual users, the pool of which is enormous and largely anonymous. The web-
sites themselves are seemingly outside the law. 
Although the fact that there is seemingly no limit on "speech" would apparently 
favour the right to freedom of expression, the reverse is true. As stated above, ex-
"Listen4Ever.com" was based in China, and consequently various record labels, unable to find a 
defendant and with difficulty of a lawsuit under Chinese law, have sought to recover from ISP 
providers ("Giants of music sue internet service providers" New Zealand Herald, 19 August 2002, 
available on the New Zealand Herald's web-site: 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?thesection=technology&thesubsection=&story1D=2 
350023>) 
98 A & M Records v Napster (2002) 284 F 3d 1091 (9 th Cir) 
99 For example "Aimster" (also known as "Madster") was within the passive conduit approach. 
However, recent changes to its service have seemingly allowed the chance of liability - see In Re: 
Aimster Copyright Litigation (2002) US Dist LEXIS 17054 (ND II) 
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ceeding the boundaries of free speech can impair the right almost as much as fal-
ling short of said boundaries. A lawless frontier where there are no rules would 
favour very few. However perhaps of greater concern to free speech arises out of 
the actions of the owners of copyright. Copyright holders are taking ever-more 
elaborate measures to protect their valuable intellectual property, measures that 
are undoubtedly breaching general free speech rights. For example, music studios 
are introducing deliberate "flaws" to their compact discs, flaws that prevent them 
being used on computer CD-ROMs, but should play without problems on the sup-
posedly more robust stereo compact disc player. But, what happens to the user 
who uses their computer as their stereo? 
This is a comparatively minor infringement, however. Copyright holders have 
also recently begun encrypting their data. The information is recorded in unread-
able form, and is only able to be decoded by an approved appliance, sometimes 
with the decryption "key" hard-wired (part of the physical construction). Further-
more, to combat "hackers," those that attempt to decipher the data, often for illicit 
purposes, the United States Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA). 100 This basically makes its an offence to attempt to subvert copy-
right protection codes. Thus not only is the work itself protected through copy-
right, but also the previous "step," the encryption of the copyrighted work. Thus 
even accepted exceptions to copyright protection (in the United States, fair use, 
and in New Zealand (for example) sections 41, 42 and 43) are prohibited, since in 
order to make use of these the encryption would have to be breached, an offence 
in itself. 101 
This breach of the right to freedom of expression was evidenced by the extremely 
high-profile United States case of Corley. 102 Movie studios had been reluctant to 
release films in digital format (on DVD) until there was a way of protecting their 
copyright. In mid-1996 the Content Scramble System (CSS) was developed. This 
is a method of encryption that prevented DVDs being played on anything except 
approved players. Subsequently DVDs were widely released and became very 
100 (1998) Pub L 105-304, § 101, 112 
101 Called the "anti-circumvention" provision, 17 USC § 120 l(a)(l) 
102 Universal City Studios, Inc. et al v Corley and 2600 Enterprises Inc. above n 14 
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popular. However, the only computer-based DVD players (as opposed to stand-
alone players) ran on the Microsoft "Windows" operating system. In 1999, Jon 
Johansen, a Norwegian teenager purchased a DVD, but it could not operate on his 
"Linux" (an alternative to Windows) system. He therefore created a program that 
would decrypt the code on the DVD and allow it to be played (and also copied) 
without a licensed player. This program was (appropriated) entitled "DeCSS," and 
word of DeCSS soon spread. The program was posted on the "hacker" web-site of 
Mr Corley known as "2600.com." A case was brought by eight movie studios 
against the web-site under the anti-trafficking provisions 103 of the DMCA. Not 
only was Corley injuncted from posting copies of the DeCSS program itself on his 
web-site, but also from linking from any other site that contained a copy of the 
program. At any level this must be considered a large breech of free speech, since 
Corley can now no longer link to any site with copies of DeCSS (no matter how 
much other information it contains), and may be liable for contempt of court if 
any site he does have existing links to subsequently posts copies. 
B Trademarks and Passing Off 
Trademark law and passing off on the internet has taken an unusual twist. The 
practice of "deep linking" has recently been the subject of litigation in the United 
States. Linking is enabled through the use of hypertext (see above), creating in-
stant cross-references to various other pages on the internet. Deep linking is where 
one web-site creates a link to another, but the target page is not the "home" page 
(the introductory page of a web-site), rather "deep" within the hierarchy of the 
linkee-site. 
This is a problem as virtually all revenue for web-sites that do not charge for ac-
cess stems from the ability to sell advertising. Sites offer a service or information 
that is useful or desirable among internet users, and reap their own commercial 
reward by selling advertising that is incidental to the web-site itself. High traffic 
sites that receive a lot of "hits" 104 are able to charge more for others to advertise. 
103 17 USC§ l20l(a)(2) & (b)(l) 
104 A "hit" occurs each time a user accesses that site, hence a measure of popularity 
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Most of this advertising occurs on the home page; hence by-passing the home 
page can cost a web-site valuable advertising revenue. 
Deep linking is not illegal in itself (since there is no direct damaging effect on the 
linkee-site), but is nevertheless deemed objectionable (due to the loss of revenue) 
by linkee-sites. Since the links often contain material of the linkee-site that is 
trademarked or likely to lead to confusion in the course of trade, breach of trade-
mark or passing off can be plead. Breach of copyright is also sometimes alleged -
in Shetland Times v Willis 105 the defendant ran a news site, but rather than write 
its own news articles it merely linked to those of the plaintiff's news site, using 
the headlines as the links. The defendant was liable for breaching the copyright 
that existed in the headlines. However, in a11 these scenarios the true complaint is 
not so much the intellectual property infringement, rather the fact that the deep 
link costs advertising revenue. 
This is obviously a unique feature of internet technology (none of the other inter-
net factors are really relevant). Without the use of the HTTP protocol it would not 
be possible to link in this manner. Furthermore, the notion that trademark can be 
used to limit "speech" outside that of the actual trademark would be largely im-
possible in a non-internet context. There is no obvious off-line analogy. 
The most obvious solution (to copyright infringement problems at least) would be 
simply to jettison the "passive conduit" approach. Alternatively, it may be possi-
ble to cater to the self-interest of internet users in other ways. It was predicted that 
the photocopier would spell the end to the book. Admittedly, it probably would be 
cheaper to photocopy an entire book rather than purchase it. However, the issue is 
ultimately one of convenience and quality, something that photocopying does not 
offer. Although digital formats potentially identical in terms of quality, in reality 
the sheer size of the files means that even with the growth of high-speed internet 
connections, files are compressed, and even the size of the movie playback on 
screen is reduced. Those that want the full experience in terms of quality will still 
pay for it. Although this is not a real solution in terms of smaller compact disc 
105 (1997) 37 IPR 71 (UK) 
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audio files, the current trend seems to be toward releasing music on DVD as well, 
including extra features such as video. In regards compact discs, it may be neces-
sary to offer additional features that will attract purchasers into buying, rather than 
copying. For example, Bon Jovi's latest release is to have a code embedded on it 
that will allow owners preferential booking for concerts and so on.106 It is perhaps 
possible to overstate the problem. On the other hand, it is not possible to overstate 
the free speech implications that have flowed from legislative efforts such as the 
DMCA. 
VIII CENSORSHIP ON THE INTERNET 
Censorship of objectionable content is a highly publicised issue. Although adult 
related material dominates, there are other forms of censorship - for example, the 
French anti-Nazi laws in Yahoo! Inc v La Ligue Cantre Le Racisme Et 
l'Antisemitisme. 107 
There is probably not a single feature of the internet that does not affect traditional 
controls on content. Firstly, as stated above, methods of self-control (for example, 
for parents wishing to control their children's access) are largely inadequate. 
However, the main area of concern is truly objectionable material, rather than re-
stricted material that becomes objectionable if the viewer is in breach of the re-
strictions. In this respect, the technology of the internet (the use of packets to 
transfer data) renders content largely unreadable in transit. The only way to 
monitor this is basically to target a specific computer and check all packets, and 
hence reassemble them to discern the content. Since data in the realm of cyber-
space is virtually uncontrollable there is no way as such to prevent objectionable 
material entering the country. 
This is compounded by the size and anonymity of the internet. It may be possible 
to have a large-scale operation in contraband pictures without any authority 
106 "Offline" Dominion Post Infotech Supplement, 30 September 2002, 6 
107 above n 93 
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detecting it. This is clearly evident from a recent New Zealand case 108 where a 
major child-pornography ring was apparently operating out of Auckland. 
Additionally, as for copyright infringement, the distributor-Jess potential of the 
internet makes it difficult to combat directly. There are no doubt many exchanges 
of prohibited material, and the only way to eliminate the problem would be to 
prosecute individually. 
Finally the problems of jurisdiction and dichotomous nature of the internet create 
serious issues. New Zealand Jaw, as stated many times, obviously does not apply 
internationally. Thus a breach of the FVPCA by an offshore server cannot be 
prosecuted. Furthermore, if the site is not breaching its domestic Jaw, they can 
virtually do as they wish in regard content. 
With an inability to control the source and transit of objectionable material, New 
Zealand authorities have fallen back on prosecuting individuals who access such 
prohibited material. However this is a difficult task in itself. It is extremely diffi-
cult to apprehend such people due to the anonymity the internet provides. Most 
prosecutions that do eventuate seem to come either from tip-offs or covert police 
action. For example, in Department of Internal Affairs v Merry 109 prosecution re-
sulted from undercover action by an Inspector of Publications within Internal 
Affairs. The Inspector entered an internet "chat room" where he found a user with 
the name "Jo 90" who ran automated advertisements stating that in return for up-
loading one file to his system, a user would be able to download another ten im-
ages. He did so, and some of the pictures he received he deemed clearly objec-
tionable. In the ensuing course of events a search warrant was executed and a 
computer that contained several objectionable pictures seized. The possessor of 
the pictures was prosecuted. 
108 "Inquiry tracks international child porn ring to Auckland" New Zealand Herald, 2 August 2002; 
available on the New Zealand Herald's web-site: 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?thesection=news&thesubsection=&storyID=23475 l 
9> (last accessed 29 September 2002) 
109 Department of Internal Affairs v Merry above n 89 
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In addition to the already stated problems in regard free speech becoming poten-
tially meaningless, like copyright there exists the potential that legislative action 
could be taken to combat the problem directly. Such action is almost inevitable to 
result in overbreadth, and have the end result of preventing material that would 
otherwise be permitted as well as the genuinely objectionable material. This is 
evidenced by United States and Australian efforts to achieve control of content. 
Australia has introduced compulsory standards in the Broadcasting Services 
Amendment (Online Services) Act 1999. Traditional attempts at control target the 
providers of content. In an effort to combat the problems the internet poses, 
Australia has legislated for Internet Service Provider (ISP) controls. Thus the ac-
tual company you pay for your internet access suddenly finds itself subject to 
controls. If a complaint110 is made to Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) 
about overseas content that is justified (if it is Australian based content, steps can 
still be taken directly 111 ), then the ABA issues notices to all ISPs stating that they 
must take steps to prevent access to such a site. This is very difficult for an ISP to 
do, but the Act also provides that the ISP may disregard this notice if there is a 
recognised alternative access prevention arrangement. 112 These alternative access 
prevention arrangements can be determined by the adoption of industry codes and 
standards, as approved by the ABA. 113 Thus self-regulation is encouraged. How-
ever, the only currently accepted alternative arrangement is the free provision by 
ISPs to customers of filter software, with all the inherent problems of this self-
control method (see above). It is thus possible for ISPs to divest themselves from 
any liability by making a program available to its subscribers, leaving it to them to 
install and monitor. Thus although there is potential overbreadth in the actual op-
eration of the filter programmes themselves, there is also the problem that the 
legislation may be "toothless," since for it to be effective, it relies ultimately on 
the active participation of individuals, installing and maintaining the filter soft-
ware. ISPs, so long as they make the software available, are immune from sanc-
tion. 
110 s 22 
111 s 30 
112 s 40(4) - (6) 
113 
SS 60(3) - 60(6) 
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Although Australia's constitution contains very few civil liberties prov1s10ns, 
some have been implied into it by the High Court of Australia. Most notably there 
is an implied right of free speech. 114 This right may be limited to a political con-
text however, since it is implied from the sections dealing with "free" elections 
and government. In order for these express freedoms to have effect, it is also nec-
essary to have free speech. However, reducing this somewhat is the later decision 
of the High Court in the Australian Lange case. 115 This case refused to allow an 
extension to the constitution-based defence to a defamation action, since the 
common law defence of qualified privilege (as modified by statute and the High 
Court in this case) provided free speech protection sufficient to meet the constitu-
tional guarantee. Although this was a case on defamation, and there is no corre-
sponding common law defence toward censorship, it does leave Australian free 
speech guarantees in a somewhat ambiguous position as both potentially limited 
to political free speech and by paying deference to pre-existing common law pro-
tections. However, within its narrow ambit, as a product of a supreme Jaw, it does 
provide stronger protections than New Zealand's subservient protections. There is 
therefore the potential for the Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online 
Services) Act 1999 to be struck down as unconstitutional. If the filter software 
were limiting people's ability to discuss and evaluate their elected representatives 
and the political climate, then the Act would be unconstitutional. It is also possi-
ble that there is a wider right to free speech to be implied, but this is not clear. 
The United States of America has had a rather more torrid time of trying to con-
trol internet content. The first attempt was the Communications Decency Act. 
This act made iJJegal a wide range of activity, including the dissemination of 
sexually explicit material on the internet. Section 502(a) of the CDA, commonly 
known as the "indecent transmission" provision, criminalized "the knowing 
transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of 
age." Section 502(d), called the "patently offensive display" provision, made 
114 Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104; Stephens v Western 
Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 211 
115 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 71 ALJR 818; 145 ALR 96 
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illegal "the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a 
manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age." 
However, the Act was never going to pass constitutional scrutiny, 116 and in Reno v 
American Civil Liberties Union 117 the Supreme Court struck down the statute as 
unconstitutional. Some reasons (among others) were that it was overbroad, failing 
to adequately define "indecent" and removing the traditional requirement that 
"patently offensive" material must utterly lack serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific merit. The CDA would also have a "chilling effect" on adults using 
the internet. For example, it was made an offence to communicate patently offen-
sive material to minors. However, knowledge that someone under 18 may receive 
it was not a requirement under this provision. Hence adults would have to adapt 
all communications to the level appropriate for a minor, since it is always possible 
that a minor may receive them. If the material did happen to be received by a mi-
nor, the sender would be subject to prosecution. This is a severe curtailment of the 
right to free speech. Furthermore the provisions designed to ensure adulthood 
were technically unfeasible or discriminatory towards some users. A similar effort 
followed in the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 118 which, although address-
ing some of the objections to the CDA, was still struck down, ultimately as the 
provisions would also infringe the right of adults to free speech, and largely for 
the same reasons as its predecessor.' 19 
The most recent effort, the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) 120 made it 
compulsory for public libraries that provide internet services to install filters. 
However, owing to the problems with filters (outlined above), and in light of 
Mainstream Loudoun v Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, 121 
where filters in one library were deemed to be unconstitutional, the statute has 
again been struck down as contrary to free speech. 122 
116 See Mark C. Alexander "The First Amendment and Problems of Political Viability: The Case 
of Internet Pornography" (2002] Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy (Summer) 977 
117 above n 67 
118 (1998) Pub L No. 105-277, 112 Stat 2681-736 
119 ACLU v Ashcroft (13 May 2002) unreported, US Supreme Court, No. 00-1293 
120 (2001) Pub L No. 106-554, tit. xii, 114 Stat 2763, 2763A-335 
121 above n 81 
122 American Library Association v United States (2002) 201 F Supp 2d 401 (ED Pa) 
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Although free speech laws in both countries are very much different to New 
Zealand (America has greater protection, and Australia has narrower, but stronger 
guarantees), it is clear that neither solution is entirely satisfactory. Australian ef-
forts are narrowly targeted at children and leave great scope for abuse in both the 
technical difficulties and a presumption of individual involvement. American en-
deavours, although they would be law in New Zealand, show the potential abuses 
toward free speech that could conceivably result. 
A telling example is that of China. Unwilling to allow its citizens free access to 
foreign media that may detract from the approved "Party" line, China has fre-
quently blocked access to many sites that contain officially condemned data. Mass 
blocking or filtering of this sort is known as a "firewall," and its critics have 
dubbed the Chinese version "the Great Firewall of China" or "the Red Firewall." 
The most recent example was that of Google, a search engine that contained a 
very popular Chinese-language service, but also offered access to other sites that 
contained data that was critical of China, in addition to various other information 
that was deemed contrary by Chinese officials. Users that attempted to access 
Google were rerouted to other less efficient, but officially sanctioned, Chinese-
based services. 123 This sort of censorship certainly has clear significant free 
speech implications. 
An interesting side-effect had developed from this sort of action: "Hactivismo," 
an association of "hackers" (independent programmers), has released a program 
called "Camera/Shy" that allows users to conceal messages within image or pic-
ture files, bypassing filtering methods that search for certain text and allowing 
people living in highly censored nations (especially China) to access this sort of 
data. Furthermore, "Mixter," an internationally known German hacker and mem-
ber of Hactivismo, announced the creation of a new internet protocol called 
"Six/Four." Named in honour of the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massa-
cre (June 4 1989 in its American format), the protocol allows the creation of 
123 "Google back online in China" BBC News, 12 September 2002; available on BBC's online 
news service: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/ l/hi/technology/2254622.stm> (last accessed 27 September 
2002) 
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"Virtual Private Networks" (VPNs). These are basically networks fenced off from 
the wider scope of the internet, similar to those used by businesses. Anyone oper-
\ ating this protocol is able to bypass traditional internet inspections and barriers, 
hence allowing access to controversial web-sites. It also allows the users to oper-
ate anonymously, and disguise content that would otherwise be subject to censure 
as innocuous data. However, although nominally in the name of free speech, 
Camera/Shy and Six/Four also allow people in "liberal" countries to trade mate-
rial that is subject to other censorship (for example, child pornography) without 
fear of detection. 124 Thus it is possible that even with legislation and viable 
prevention methods, censorship will still be able to be bypassed. 
IX SUPPRESSION ON THE INTERNET 
Really the only two internet related features that have a bearing on this limitation 
of free speech are that of jurisdiction and the dichotomous nature, however the 
combination is such that it may render the entire concept of court ordered sup-
pression futile. The typical penalty for breach of a court order is to hold the person 
in breach in contempt of court. This may result in a fine, or even imprisonment in 
extreme cases. It is an action in personam, acting against the person him or her-
self. However, for an in personam action to work, the person must be within the 
reach of the court's powers. Thus a person in contempt of a New Zealand court 
order in America or the United Kingdom is likely to suffer very few conse-
quences. 
This was manifestly demonstrated in the "American Billionaire" 125 and "Mr X 
Kidnapping" 126 cases. In the former, the high profile nature of the offender, in 
addition to the nature of the offence (drug related) combined with the person in 
question's views on the subject (he is an ardent supporter of decriminalisation or 
marijuana) led to the story being reported in the United States. Similarly in the 
124 "Hactivismo hatches plot to sneak through censorship gaps" New Zealand Herald, 6 August 
2002; available on the New Zealand Herald's web-site: 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?thesection=technology&thesubsection=&storylD=2 
347986> (last accessed 26 September 2002) 
125 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd above n 19 
126 above n 63 
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latter scenario, the sensational nature of the intended offence, again combined 
with the British nationality of the alleged offenders led to the story being reported 
in the United Kingdom. Without the internet, this sort of scenario still may have 
occurred, but would not carry with it the same degree of consequence. Even if the 
lead story of an English newspaper breached the most severe suppression order 
there would still be few in New Zealand that would know of it. The coverage is 
simply insufficient. However, inevitably that English paper will make it available 
on its web-site, a web-site that is very accessible to any New Zealander with a 
cursory interest. Thus although technically any New Zealander who disseminated 
the information gleaned from such a source in contempt of the suppression order 
would be potentially subject to proceedings in New Zealand, like copyright and 
objectionable content, it does not address the source of the problem. 
Free speech is clearly implicated in the context that New Zealanders (especially 
news providing services) have less of a right to impart information that more di-
rectly concerns them than those off-shore, who do have such an ability. Further-
more, the recipients of such information cannot receive the information from do-
mestic services, but can do so from international sources. In reality it does not 
really make any difference to the internet user whether they type in "news.co.uk" 
or "news.co.nz," yet in the latter scenario they cannot receive particular types of 
information whereas in the former they can. Not only is there discrimination in the 
expression of such information, but there may also be discrimination in the receipt 
too. Anyone with the internet can access the data, but those without cannot. 
Moreover, those with the internet cannot inform their neighbours without it of the 
information, since to do so would be in contempt. 
However, for an overseas news agency to get information of court proceedings, 
someone who is present in court at the time of the proceedings must have com-
mjtted contempt him or herself by informing others. Hence in a similar vein to the 
potential ways forward for defamation and copyright, it is necessary to pander to 
the interests of those that may be in breach. If people in court (especially journal-
ists) do not start taking more responsible attitudes, proceedings may be closed to 
the public entirely so as to protect the sanctity of court orders. If journalists are 
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excluded then reporting on court activities will suffer. Furthermore, prosecuting 
those that do breach court orders is necessary. 127 
X FURTHER INTERNET CHANGES 
A Trespass to Chattels 
In addition to these accepted limitations on free speech, the internet has also de-
veloped some limitations unique to it. One in particular that has been used to pre-
vent what we may regard as free speech is the ancient tort of trespass to chattels. 
Although it may seem somewhat anachronistic to use a tort that was originally 
designed to compensate for interference with goods short of conversion to prevent 
free speech, the vagaries of the internet have allowed it. The modified internet tort 
has stemmed from advertising revenue and the use of "robot aggregators." 
Robot aggregators are automated programs that search through pre-programmed 
web-sites looking for data of interest to the user of the aggregator. The most 
common example is search engines. When someone is unsure of the web-site they 
desire, most will use a service such as Yahoo! or Google to search for their object 
of interest. However, it would take far too long for a search engine to search every 
page on the internet for the terms of interest, so search engines constantly visit 
every page on the internet, recording their address and content in the search en-
gines' own databases. Although these are the most common, other forms of ag-
gregator visit web-sites and remove certain information of interest to the aggre-
gator user. This occurred in e-Bay Inc v Bidder's Edge Inc128 and Ticketmaster 
Corp. v Tickets.cam Inc, 129 where the defendants sent robot aggregators into the 
plaintiffs' sites and automatically copied data of interest. In the first case, it was 
127 For example, a New Zealand journalist, Jane Clifton, allegedly breached the "Mr X" 
suppression order in an article written for an overseas newspaper ("Decision over prosecution of 
columnist delayed" New Zealand Herald, 20 August 2002; available at the New Zealand Herald's 
web-site: 
<http://www. nzherald. co. nz/latestnewss tory .c fm ?story ID=23 5 0207 &thesecti on=news&thesubsecti 
on=general&thesecondsubsection=latest> (last accessed 30 September 2002) 
128 (2000) F Supp 2d 1058 (ND Cal) 
129 (August 10 2000) United States District Court (CD Cal) Case No CV99-7654-HLH (BQRx); 
(2000) US Dist LEXIS 12987; Copy L Rep (CCH) P28,146 
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the items for sale, price and so on, while in the latter the information copied was 
the date of concerts and event, the price of tickets and where tickets were avail-
able. In this situation it is not necessary to visit the plaintiff's site at all - poten-
tially a large loss in terms of advertising revenue. 
The use of robot aggregators as search engines causes difficulties for web-sites as 
frequently the word searched for is not on the home page, rather a page "deep" 
within the hierarchy of the web-site (hence it is known as "deep linking"). Click-
ing on the link the search engine produces does not take a user to the home page 
with its advertising, rather to the page with the term of interest. The advertising is 
therefore bypassed, with a corresponding decrease in the number of "hits" and 
hence the advertising revenue for the web-site. 
Thee-Bay Inc v Bidder's Edge Inc 130 and Ticketmaster Corp. v Tickets.corn Inc 131 
situation is a difficulty unique to the United States owing to its distinct copyright 
laws. Copyright does not arise in mere compilations of facts that lack a "creative 
spark." This is known as the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, where recovery is pre-
vented when only labour and no originality has gone into the creation of a 
work. 132 Thus in the United States it is not possible to use copyright to protect 
facts posted on a web-site. Robot aggregators are hence entitled to copy data. If 
the information is posted elsewhere, there is a decrease in the revenue available to 
the original web-site as users access the data elsewhere. 
If it is not illegal to deep link, and not possible to prevent extraction using copy-
right, then the innovative plaintiff will naturally try an alternative method. The 
tort that was hit upon is that of trespass to chattels. This tort "lies where an inten-
tional interference with the possession of personal property has proximately 
caused injury." 133 As discussed above, the internet exists on two distinct levels, 
the ethereal level of cyberspace, and the physical reality of circuits and magnetic 
particles. By targeting the latter, the plaintiffs in these cases constructed an 
130 above n 128 
131 above n 129 
132 Feist Publications v Rural Telephone Service Co ( 1991) 499 US 340; 113 L Ed 2d 358; 111 S 
Ct 1282 
133 Thrifty-Tel v Bezenek (1996) 46 Cal App 4tli 1559, 1566 
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argument that the defendants' programmes interfered with and harmed their 
"chattels." The harm alleged is a loss of system resources. Any person who has 
used a computer knows that the larger the size or number of programs being run, 
the slower the computer operates. Hence the plaintiff's alleged the presence of 
others' programs harmed their system resources, and the ability of their chattels to 
operate effectively. 
Although this form of action does not formally attack free speech itself, rather tar-
geting the acts that lead up to the "speech," nevertheless the true goal of the tort is 
to control the actual content the defendant posts. If the plaintiff's web-site is the 
only one with that information, then it must receive more hits and hence more ad-
vertising revenue. One may go on to say however, that there is no problem with 
this action in the New Zealand context: actions of this sort would (probably) be 
covered under our copyright law. 134 However the tort has been extended to actions 
that are very much against the tenets of free speech protection. 
It is estimated that 200 billion e-mails will be sent this year. 135 This equates to 
over 6,300 every second. An e-mail may consist of a few hurried lines to a distant 
relative, a mundane query to a work colleague, or poor-taste jokes to a group of 
friends. Another form of e-mail is "spam," unsolicited junk mail. Most find this 
very annoying, most especially ISPs who provide e-mail accounts. They are re-
quired to deliver it, using system resources. The ability to find people who occupy 
system resources liable was eagerly seized upon by ISPs to combat the "spam-
mers." In America Online Inc v National Health Care Discount Inc 136 AOL, the 
plaintiff, obtained an award of US$337,500.00 and a permanent injunction against 
the defendant for the loss of system resources following 150 million unsolicited e-
134 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill [1964] 1 All ER 465; Telecom v Colour Pages (14 
August 1997) unreported, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP142/97. The Ladbroke case 
expresses the orthodox view of copyright law, that originality (and hence copyright) stems from 
"skill, judgment and labour" of the creator. The "and" is treated as "or" in most situations, hence 
labour alone is sufficient to give rise to copyright. The Telecom case is the most recent New 
Zealand endorsement of the principle. However, the Telecom case is merely interlocutory, and 
hence not definitive. Canada, for example, cites Ladbroke for the opposite, that mere "sweat of the 
brow" is insufficient, and skill, judgment and labour is required (Tele-Direct v American Business 
Information (27 October 1991) unreported, FCA, A553-96) 
135 <http://www.waller.co.uk/web.htm> (last accessed 28 September 2002) 
136 (2001) 174 F Supp 2d 890 (ND Iowa) 
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mails sent to AOL subscribers - seemingly a laudable outcome (except for the 
spammers). 
However, if you are a person who sends the odd e-mail to a relative, work col-
league or friend, each and every one of these recipients could potentially have a 
cause of action in trespass to chattels against you, the sender. In the cases that es-
tablished the potential for an action in trespass to chattels, the element that the de-
fendant's actions must lead to harm to the plaintiff's chattels is emphasised. In e-
Bay Inc v Bidder's Edge Inc 131 this claim had some basis, with the plaintiff alleg-
ing that up to 10 per cent of its system resources were being used by the defen-
dant. In the following case, Ticketmaster Corp. v Tickets.cam Inc, 138 an interlocu-
tory injunction application, relief was denied on the basis that a lack of significant 
harm led to the balance of convenience favouring the defendant. However, shortly 
following the AOL139 case, in Intel Corporation v Hamidi, 140 the defendant, 
Hamidi, was injuncted from sending e-mails to Intel Corporation e-mail ad-
dresses, following six e-mails, although to a large portion of the Intel mailing 
list. 141 This seemingly reduces the harm requirement and greatly expands the 
breadth of the tort - something that must severely infringe the freedom of speech. 
B The Criminal Law 
Not specific to the internet, but of computers generally, is a similar New Zealand 
development to the tort of trespass to chattels in the criminal sphere. Section 
298(4) of the Crimes Act 1961 provides for an offence of wilful damage to prop-
erty. In the case of R v Garrett, 142 damage was defined to include alterations that 
either cause harm to the property or cause it to perform in an unexpected way, re-
quiring intervention to restore the property to its original state. Alteration was in 
137 above n 128 
138 above n 129 
139 America Online Inc v National Health Care Discount Inc above n 136 
140 (2001) 94 Cal App 4th 325; 113 Cal Rptr 2d 244 
141 It has been estimated that it costs an ISP US$2.50 per 1,000 e-mails (America Online Inc v 
National Health Care Discount Inc above n 136, 899). Even if Hamidi sent each of his six e-mai ls 
to the few thousand people on the Intel mailing list, at most the harm is caused is less than 
US$50.00 
142 (2001) NZDCR LEXIS 103 
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tum defined to include the alteration of the magnetic particles on the hard disk of 
a computer. Since any sent e-mail is stored on the hard disk, and deleting it (hence 
restoring full functionality in terms of available space) requires effort, in New 
Zealand it may be possible to be found criminally liable for sending someone an 
e-mail. 
C Other Areas Affected 
In addition to the laws that are described above that are directly changed by 
internet-related concerns, other areas of law may also be affected, simply by the 
ease and safety with which one can breach the law. Any crime that involves 
"speech" of any kind, such as breaches of patent law, privacy and even anti-
espionage and some treason laws are made much easier and safer by the anonym-
ity and ease of communication the internet provides. 
In terms of a way forward, the courts must recognise that even though some ac-
tions can be analogised to internet related factual scenarios, such analogies are not 
always appropriate. Courts need to feel free to add additional elements where the 
interests of justice demand, although also on a principled basis. The extended 
Hamidi 143 version of trespass to chattels provides a good example: although 
receiving e-mails does technically impair the performance of a chattel, this must 
be viewed in light of the fact that the same action is done willingly 6,300 times a 
second. A requirement that the damage be more than de minirnis is perhaps re-
quired. 
XI CONCLUSION 
It is eminently clear that the internet makes fundamental changes to the way that 
we consider free speech and free speech-limitation law. In many ways the internet 
is the new "Wild West," a lawless frontier where anything goes. However it is a 
frontier that extends across the globe and is one of, if not the, most pervasive in-
fluence in the 21 st Century. It is necessary to entirely reconsider the way we con-
143 Intel Corporation v Hamidi above n 140 
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sider and emphasise free speech, and in different ways in different contexts. If we 
desire to maintain the status quo, or at least not introduce radical changes, it is 
necessary to go beyond the traditional approach of using analogies to adapt older 
laws to new situations. In most situations the analogies are simply inadequate 
when applied to internet scenarios. It may be necessary to apply the law differ-
ently in order to achieve the same result. Ultimately it may prove impossible to 
apply traditional legal methodologies, and a better approach is to cater to the self-
interest of the internet community. 
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